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MONEY THAT BURNS LIKE OIL: A SRI LANKAN 
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MORALITY AND AGENCY1 
Michele Ruth Gamburd 
Portland State University 
New labor opportunities have drawn Sri Lankan women to work as domestic servants in 
the Middle East. Many migrants complain that their remittances "burn like oil," 
disappearing without a trace. The gendered discourse on burning remittances both draws 
on and contradicts an older cultural system that fetishizes money. The emerging logic 
provides symbolic resources for women to spend their remittances on advancements for 
the nuclear family, distancing themselves from other kin. (Migration, remittances, 
fetishism, Sri Lanka, Middle East) 
During an interview in May 2000, Nilani, who had worked for five years as a 
domestic servant in the Middle East, passionately remarked, "The money you earn 
abroad-you have to use it right away, or it will just disappear. That money burns 
like oil!" She explained that because employers begrudged paying their servants' 
wages, their ill will and dislike tainted the housemaid's money. Many such Sri 
Lankan labor migrants felt that unless a woman and her family used the money 
quickly, something bad would happen to take it away from them. 
Since the early 1980s, labor migration from Sri Lanka has burgeoned, reaching 
nearly one million individuals in 2002 (SLBFE 2003). In 2003, the Sri Lankan 
Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) estimated that 680,000 women were 
working abroad, over 80 per cent of them as housemaids in the Middle East (SLBFE 
2003).2 For the past dozen years, I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the 
village of Naeaegama, situated near the main coastal highway in southern Sri Lanka.3 
Many married and some unmarried women from Naeaegama go abroad repeatedly 
on two-year contracts, leaving behind husbands, children, and other family members, 
to whom they remit money. Over the years, the Sri Lankan government has grown 
increasingly dependent on labor migration to relieve local unemployment and bring 
in much-needed foreign exchange. Consequently, individuals, communities, and 
political institutions develop ever-more intricate and binding ties to the global 
economy (Gamburd 2003). 
As they pursue these labor opportunities, Naeaegama women attribute new sorts 
of agentive force to fate, emotions, and money. Local people approach the 
phenomenon of burning remittances with degrees of literalness, ranging from a 
metaphoric sense of alienation (as if the worker's social circumstances took away her 
control over her wages) to an attribution of lifelike power and agency to the money 
itself. Migrants and their families currently use discourses about he agency of money 
(both metaphoric and fetishized) to justify new financial strategies and decrease their 
obligations to distant kin. An older discourse about exchange correlates with a local 
social structure of extended family solidarity, which provides social insurance but 
levels out individual advancement. The emerging discourse about exchange retains 
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many of the social and moral components of the older system, including an 
attribution of agency to money and emotions, but changes several key elements. The 
new discourse supports emerging financial practices oriented to the advancement of 
the nuclear family. This essay explores the shifts in social and moral norms 
embedded in emerging local views of agency. 
A spirited debate in the literature focuses on how integration into the international 
economy influences social relations. Few disagree that gender roles and family 
structures change in the wake of new economic opportunities and challenges 
(Fernandez-Kelly 1983: 177-94; Harrison 1997; Constable 1997:vii-xiv, 17-39). Some 
scholars suggest that boundless human inventiveness will create coherent lived 
realities out of the chaos of postcolonial, postmodern society (Anderson 1994; 
Clifford 1994; Gupta 1992). Others feel that the capitalist market will generate an 
inauthentic or hyperreal culture crafted for the tourist gaze, or even a homogenized 
world free of local color (Garnham 1993; see also Crain 1996; Volkman 1990). In 
this line, Nash (2000:129) concludes, "Marx's dire predictions about the alienation 
of producers in a fetishized world, where all social relations would be reduced to 
exchange relations and measured in cash terms, has within a century and a half of his 
death come to pass." 
But has integration into the global economy necessarily plunged all workers into 
alienation, let alone into a uniform and commensurable alienation? In what sense 
have migrant women lost control over the fruits of their toil? Evidence from 
Naeaegama suggests that while Sri Lankan women's domestic work in West Asia 
does indeed place them at a distinct disadvantage in the international division of 
labor, their proletarian position in the global economy does not automatically lead to 
a simple or straightforward understanding of alienation, to social relations reduced 
to exchange relations alone, or to exchange relations of a predictable and culture-free 
kind. Although transnational capitalism does affect concepts of money and structures 
of kinship, it has not (or at least has not yet) erased local concepts of morality and 
agency. 
Just as Marx's (1967 [1867]) discussion of commodity fetishism (the attribution 
of agency to capital and commodities in Western capitalist culture) suggests deep- 
seated social relations, so too in Naeaegama the burning-remittances discourse (the 
attribution of agency to money earned in the Middle East) simultaneously maps and 
obscures a social reality of labor and exchange relations between people. The 
distinctive Naeaegama interpretation of local and international exploitation manifests 
most clearly in discourses surrounding money. The local cultural logic includes a 
moral component concerning how money is earned and exchanged. It also includes 
a social component concerning the relative positions in society of the actors involved 
in the exchange, and the emotions they feel toward one another. How people earn 
money affects how they think to spend it. Migrants use the emerging discourse on 
agency to legitimize their choice to spend wages earned abroad for the nuclear family 
rather than distributing money to a wider group of relatives, a financial strategy that 
many villagers would not have tolerated in the past. International labor migration has 
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shaped village views of money, morality, and kinship, modifying older concepts of 
money in new and sometimes contradictory ways. These nascent discourses 
surrounding money in turn transform local conceptions of people's financial 
responsibilities and obligations to the extended family. But contrary to Nash's (2000) 
assertion, local social relations have not been reduced to mere exchange relations 
measured in cash terms. 
MONEY AND AGENCY 
Simmel (1978 [1900]) suggests that money symbolizes exchange and serves to 
integrate society in a much more complex system than mere barter could support. 
The form money takes correlates with the form of society. Hart (1986:638-39) notes 
that in market economies, "money is at the same time an aspect of relations between 
persons and a thing detached from persons," evoking money's simultaneous 
connection to social processes and its transactional anonymity. Money is an 
impersonal medium of exchange, a store of wealth, a standard of value, a unit of 
account, and a means of deferred payments (Melitz 1970:1020; Struthers and Speight 
1986:3-6). The system of money arises through collective imagination and relies on 
mutual trust. It reflects in microcosm the larger social world (Poggi 1993:149). 
Economists rely on the presumption that "money presents a frictionless surface 
to history," and no one knows or cares who has owned it or how it has changed 
hands (Graeber 1996:6). Yet the Euro-American folk concepts of "dirty money" and 
"filthy lucre" suggest that moral contexts affect how people think about money. 
Economists often consider general-purpose money as morally neutral and usable to 
exchange for anything else (Codere 1968:557). But in any culture there are certain 
objects and services that should not be exchanged for money (Parry 1989:88); e.g., 
in the West, sexual favors and political influence. While economists strictly separate 
these cultural elements from their discussions, anthropologists have long noted the 
value of a holistic approach to the study of exchange (Malinowski 1984 [1922]; 
Mauss 1990 [1925]; Parry and Bloch 1989). The symbolic and structural properties 
of money reveal complex cultural logics. Many cultures share concepts surrounding 
ill-gotten gains (Shipton 1997), but the actions that violate norms, and the conse- 
quences that follow, vary from place to place. For example, when Euro-Americans 
think that money has been earned in illegal and unjust ways, they do not consider the 
money itself (in cash or in bank accounts) to be altered by the events. Nor, unlike 
some Sri Lankans, do they discuss the money owner's future in terms of possible 
self-initiated actions that his or her money might take. 
Fetishism is the attribution of magical or lifelike power to an object. Holding a 
rabbit's foot to bring good luck or avoiding a tabooed food to avert disaster suggests 
that these items possesses power and agency. Such beliefs often index wider cultural 
norms and values. In his analysis of fetishism, Marx (1967 [1867]:50) focuses on the 
attribution of agency to capital and commodities. He suggests that in capitalist 
societies, labor is artificially separated from life and given a value, and that value is 
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alienated from the proletarian producer and transformed into a misleading belief in 
the power and worth of the object (commodity) created. Attributing a value to the 
commodity fetishizes it; the value obscures, through "magic and necromancy" (Marx 
1967 [1867]:59), the labor relations and exchange relations between people. Taussig 
(1980) takes this approach a step further in discussing baptized money and devil 
contracts, examining how postcolonial structures of power and inequality on 
Columbian plantations and in Bolivian mines reverberate in local categories 
surrounding production and exchange. Cultural concepts of value relate closely to 
those of personhood, agency, social relations, and morality (Breton 2000; Graeber 
1996; Masquelier 1999; Osella and Osella 2000). 
Notions about the nature of money that govern proper and improper modes of 
exchange shape actors' sense of themselves and the world around them. People 
always act within restrictive structures that limit the range of the choices they 
perceive as possible (Ortner 1989). The burning-money syndrome suggests that many 
Naeaegama people exchange money within a particular moral universe that reflects 
a local sense of justice and responsibility. They conceptualize the violation of norms 
and duties in terms of economic consequences exchanged as part of (or parceled with) 
the money itself. In the moral universe of burning money, agency does not reside 
solely in human beings; money and the power that adheres to it behave according to 
moral rules. Furthermore, people identify agentive powers in emotional energies, 
planetary influences, and karmic effects of past actions, all of which influence actions 
and outcomes. 
These extended concepts of agency and causality are linked to a porous sense of 
personhood. People in Naeaegama see themselves and others as permeable to outside 
forces. In this sense, people are "fluid signs" open to and participating in their wider 
social environment (Daniel 1984). Similarly, the burning-money syndrome shows the 
importance of interpersonal mixing and mingling to personal identity, as Trawick 
(1990) notes in her discussion of love in a Tamil family. 
Naeaegama views of money and agency (many of which run counter to Western 
philosophical and economic assumptions about exchange, free will, and individuality) 
have begun to shift and change in the face of transnational labor migration (Gamburd 
2000a, 2000b). Practice theorists suggest that while structures constrain actions, 
through their everyday practices actors both reproduce and transform the structures 
that guide behavior (Sahlins 1981). Interpreting what Naeaegama villagers say about 
agency, causality, and personhood requires deciphering degrees of literalness. At 
certain times the stories suggest beliefs in animism and fetishism; at other times they 
suggest metaphorical ways to describe social realities. 
LIFE IN NAEAEGAMA 
In 1968, my mother arrived in Naeaegama with my father and me to begin her 
dissertation research (Gamburd 1972). I have been working in the village since 1991, 
and speak fairly fluent Sinhala, the local language. My two research associates and 
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I have performed a thorough census, gathered kinship data, and developed a detailed 
map of the village. We have interviewed people from each family and have gathered 
life histories. We have attended funerals, weddings, and political rallies, listened to 
gossip, and collected jokes and stories. These research techniques provide multiple 
avenues of insight into what Naeaegama residents say, do, feel, and believe. 
The village covers about one square mile, and in 2004 it had a population of 
roughly 1,100. Most villagers live on modest housing plots interspersed between 
paddy fields, coconut gardens, and cinnamon estates owned by wealthy landholders. 
High unemployment rates show that available jobs have not kept pace with population 
growth. Local jobs processing cinnamon and making rope and brooms from coconut 
fiber provide insufficient employment. Many men now hold jobs in the armed 
services. Many women work in local garment factories. But the most prominent 
female employment is work as domestic servants in the Middle East. 
Since the 1973 oil embargo, much wealth has flowed into the Middle East, which 
produces a quarter of the world's oil (Energy Information Administration 1997, 
1999). Gulf countries hire a large number of foreign guest workers, who in recent 
years have come increasingly from Asia. Sri Lankan women make up about 30 per 
cent of the housemaids working in the Gulf. Women from Indonesia and the 
Philippines make up the remainder (Gamburd 2000a:34). Nine per cent of Sri 
Lanka's working-age women are currently employed in the Middle East (Gamburd 
2000a:39). Since the early 1980s, increasing numbers of Naeaegama women have 
sought jobs as housemaids in West Asia. They go abroad on two-year contracts, and 
often return repeatedly. Over 40 per cent of Naeaegama households have or have had 
at least one family member working abroad. In the early 1990s, most of the migrants 
were married, but now a growing number are unmarried. In many cases, they pay 
job agents and moneylenders between US$300-600 to procure their employment. 
While abroad, they earn about US$100 a month, a wage that has held steady for the 
past twenty years. They send their remittances to their families, who often use the 
money for daily consumption. Most families hope to save enough money to buy land 
and build a house (Gamburd 2003). Workers' remittances around the world are 
"second only to oil as the single producer of the movement of funds affecting the 
world balance of payments" (Myron Weiner, quoted in Lelyveld 1992). Saudi Arabia 
alone pays a quarter of these remittances (Migration News 2001). 
The livelihood of women, their families, and their communities depends on labor 
migration and remittances. Such a large migration stream, operating both in 
international and local contexts, also inevitably affects concepts of money, work, and 
family structure. 
A CULTURAL LOGIC OF LABOR AND MONEY 
The cultural logic of labor and money expressed in the phrase, "That money 
burns like oil," integrates several interlocking concepts. One piece of the logic 
considers how people make money-by hard work or through exploitative or 
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fortuitous schemes-and how these methods affect the future. A second piece treats 
the exchange of money, including standards of fairness and reasonableness for how 
money changes hands. In this context, assessing fairness requires noting the social 
positions of the actors. A third piece rests on emotions (such as guilt, anger, greed, 
and jealousy), which can harm or otherwise influence people and their money. Many 
Naeaegama residents believe that the evil eye and a malicious tongue can lead to 
illness, suffering, and even death. Karmic forces (fate) and planetary influences 
revealed in people's horoscopes also affect economic prosperity. 
Money That Thrives, Money That Burns 
Money earned by "sweat and tiredness" (daadiyayi mahaansii) is good. Wages 
and money earned from small entrepreneurial enterprises fall into this category. 
Money earned through hard work will bring luck and prosperity (yaa denawaa). Such 
money makes a person or family thrive and flourish. Money earned through hard 
work will not burn. A fraction of it may go to waste, but the rest will prove fruitful 
and useful for the family. The opposite of money that thrives is money that burns or 
disappears without a trace. Money earned through exploitation or acquired by sheer 
chance will often burn. Many Naeaegama people feel it necessary to spend "burning 
money" quickly, before it figures out how to get away. They think of thriving or 
burning as an effect of how the money was obtained. For example, household goods 
purchased with burning money often prove unreliable. The money will not burn if 
transferred to an innocent third party; the effect usually lingers with the miscreant, 
but can sometimes pass to his or her family members, particularly children. 
Informants ometimes described burning as an active property of the money itself 
(fetishism); in other cases, exchanges generated bad effects that lingered with the 
agent but not with the transferred cash; and in still other cases, burning provided a 
metaphoric critique of larger social circumstances, a model for how a just world 
would look. 
Bribes 
Many activities that generate money are not associated with hard or moral work, 
including taking bribes, lending money, gambling, selling illicit liquor, and stealing. 
A complex logic governs whether money earned in exploitative ways will thrive or 
burn. With bribery, Naeaegama residents find one type of bribe-like gift conscion- 
able. For example, people see no harm in a satisfied client giving a thank-you present 
to a helpful individual at a government agency, or school children giving cookies to 
their teachers. These gifts are given gladly, with pleasure, love, and respect. The 
money or objects received will thrive for the recipient. Villagers view as less benign 
the sort of bribe associated with illegal payments demanded by a person in a position 
of power, perhaps someone who already receives a salary to do the job in question. 
Naeaegama residents differ in their opinions about whether this bribe money will 
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thrive for the recipient. Many say that it will not. For example, Irangani, an older 
woman, remarked, "If the person being bribed scares you, or demands the bribe, that 
isn't good. The money is given with a burning heart. It will not thrive for the 
person." Other villagers suggested that people pay bribes "while sighing (huul 
lanavaa)." The emotions behind "burning hearts" and "sighing" adversely affect the 
recipient of the money. 
Repeatedly earning money in less than moral ways or coming into a one-time ill- 
gotten fortune, villagers say, creates a long-term effect. Some people feel that the 
money might help the recipient prosper for the moment, but he or she will go broke 
in the future. No particular bank account or purchased object carries this onus; the 
bad luck adheres instead to the individual or family. In contrast, some people think 
future prosperity will depend entirely on how the person who receives the bribe 
decides to use the money. These people argue that correct usage will yield a profit, 
and disregard what others see as the money's inherent tendency to burn. Richer 
villagers, particularly merchants and moneylenders, often express this sentiment. This 
diversity of cultural views reflects hierarchies of wealth and power within the local 
community. 
Part of the cultural logic of money depends on the relative position of various 
actors within the social structure. A local astrologer suggested that whether bribe 
money would thrive or not depended on the relative wealth of the people giving and 
demanding it, and the size of the bribe. A large bribe demanded from a poor person 
by a relatively wealthy civil servant would not thrive for the civil servant, while a 
small present received by a poor bureaucrat from a wealthy person would thrive for 
that bureaucrat. In this way, the discourse of burning money provides a defense for 
the poor and powerless against the rich and influential in an economic system rife 
with exploitation and inequalities. 
One woman, Rani, added an element of character analysis and habitual behavior. 
She said, "Bribes probably do thrive for their recipients, or people wouldn't ask for 
them! But then the recipient will go and get drunk on that money, so it won't bring 
him prosperity after all." A retired policeman confirmed this. He asserted that 
although he never asked for bribes, he and his colleagues received them anyway. 
They never brought goods or money from corrupt activities home because, "With 
that sort of money you're happy for the day, but it's bad for tomorrow." Similarly, 
a hospital worker who received extra money for helping with autopsies said that he 
never brought that money home. How they earn money influences how and when 
they decide to spend it. People use up burning money right away, lest it disappear 
and harm the domestic sphere in the process. 
Moneylending, Gambling, Stealing, and Selling Illicit Liquor 
Similarities and additional points arise from an analysis of moneylending, 
gambling, stealing, and selling illicit liquor. When asked whether money gained 
through these activities would thrive for the actor, informants consistently referred 
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to the agentive effects of fear, anger, and greed. For example, men in the village 
gamble heavily during the New Year season, and sums of money equaling a month's 
wages change hands swiftly. An older man said, "The loser is crying and the winner 
is laughing. That money won't thrive for the winner." Speaking of people repaying 
a moneylender, a retired school principal said, "The person returns the money and 
the interest saying, 'a poo' (my goodness! Wow! Good grief!). So that money will 
burn." Another person said, "People give it back it while sighing. The moneylender 
is eating that person's fire." This view of identity emphasizes the permeability of 
people to the anger, jealousy, and dislike of others with whom they transact. 
I asked the astrologer about protection from cursing. He answered, "The only 
way is to be a reasonable person. You only really feel the effect of the curse through 
your own guilty heart. This is a matter of conscience, and you can't cure that except 
by leading a good life. If a rich person lives reasonably, then he or she doesn't need 
to do any rituals for protection." His comments about a bad conscience suggest that 
both partners in an exchange understand its moral implications; one feels righteous 
anger, the other guilt. The concepts of burning and thriving thus index a shared 
moral universe.4 Regardless of how literally people take these beliefs, the ideas shape 
their behavior and judgments about its merit. 
Discussions of burning and thriving often contrast current wealth with destitution 
in the future. For example, speaking of an illicit liquor producer, the retired 
policeman said, "Such a person might live well for the moment, but he will die like 
a dog, stabbed or shot." The officer talked about this as a pragmatic matter of 
keeping bad company and losing the respect of the community. Others talked about 
it as karmic just desserts, inevitable on a moral level due to the effect of earning 
money in a bad way. Similar consideration of future destitution surfaced in a 
discussion of theft. One young man said, "If you steal or cheat, then even if you are 
doing it to bring food for your hungry children, it won't be good. For example, if 
you steal a hundred rupees and bring food, your kids will eat it and get sick, and you 
will have to pay three hundred rupees for medicine. This is because the person who 
lost the money or the item is cursing the robber." In this case the effect of a bad 
deed takes an immediate toll. It is transferred from the stolen currency to the 
purchased object (food) and passed from the sinful parent to the innocent children. 
Fates worse than destitution await those who run afoul of the morality of 
economic exchanges. For example, the shameful activity of moneylending presents 
dangers to moneylenders and their families. Most moneylenders are women, and 
most try to maintain a low profile to minimize possible disadvantages for their 
families. For example, one lender kept her activities quiet to avert the bad effects for 
her daughters, since local people find it objectionable to use moneylending money 
(burning money) for a dowry.5 When another moneylender's young son inhaled a 
small pen piece he had been using as a whistle, the metal remained undiscovered for 
over a year, causing repeated bouts of bad bronchitis. The villagers blamed this bad 
luck in part on the mother's moneylending. A third moneylender's son died in his 
early twenties of cancer. In addition to discussing the cancer within the medical 
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model, people said the boy got the disease from "eating" bad money. These cases 
reveal cultural beliefs about moneylending, gendered constraints on women's 
economic activities, and local assumptions about the contagious effects of ill will 
from mothers to children. 
Thriving and burning properties of income from moneylending and gambling 
reveal the importance of the relative position of actors within the social structure. If 
a lender charges high interest from a poor person, she should feel guilty. If she 
charges a reasonable rate of interest from a businessman who can repay the loan 
easily, that money will thrive for her. The moneylender's future prosperity depends 
on the financial situation of the person taking and repaying the loan. Regarding 
gambling, the retired policeman said, 
How gambling will affect the winner depends on how much harm has been done to the loser and, 
especially, the loser's family. The winnings might come from a house with hungry kids. If the guy 
wants to play just to play, that's okay, but if he takes the money for the kids' milk and his wife's 
dresses, that's bad. If he loses, his household falls into trouble. That curse will come to the winner. 
That money will burn. 
The winner's future depends on the well-being of the gambler who lost. Methods of 
self-protection reflect the same logic of social position. The retired school principal 
said that a rich person could in part escape troubles by supporting an orphanage, 
helping a sick person, or giving money to a social service. Monetary exchanges thus 
express a local awareness of inequality and a sense of social justice. 
The relational properties of money manifest a Robin Hood principle of theft. One 
informant asserted, "It's okay to steal from rich people. It's just like taking a cup of 
water out of the sea; they don't notice the loss." Similarly, the astrologer suggested 
that it was not wrong to embezzle money from government projects and nongovern- 
mental organizations that get funding from abroad. His father-in-law disagreed, 
saying that to cheat or steal was wrong under any circumstances. The astrologer felt 
no one would notice the thefts or curse the robber; he considered the situation as a 
means of redistributing wealth from the complacent rich to the deserving needy. His 
father-in-law considered embezzlement, like theft, independent of social position or 
need. In this vein, some people view individuals and institutions differently. Banks 
charge a reasonable interest rate, but require collateral for a loan. Many Naeaegama 
residents have no collateral, and so borrow from moneylenders, who charge interest 
rates ranging from 10 to 20 per cent per month. Most women who borrow money 
to pay agents for jobs in the Middle East pay back twice what they borrow. Local 
people see interest charged by banks as reasonable; that charged by moneylenders is 
not. While this reflects the actual interest rates, it also reflects issues of agency. 
Large institutions like banks are relatively faceless, with no specific agent responsible 
for charging the interest. Bank employees merely do a salaried job; they do not 
intentionally enter into the moral universe of money exchange, and are not hurt by 
the borrowers' anger. In contrast, moneylenders set their own interest rates, and 
become vulnerable to an angry borrower's ill will. 
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A similar dynamic governs the difference between local gambling and the 
national lottery. When lottery money is won, "it's because of merit (pin) from past 
lives." The retired policeman said, "No one suffers because no one lost a big 
amount." The reasonable stakes, the government's use of the collected funds for 
social services, and the lack of a village individual who profits from the gambling 
make the lottery morally neutral and its winnings thrive. In contrast, gambling 
earnings burn. Perceptions of moral responsibility shape these contrasting views. 
Character assessment and notes on habitual behavior also entered into discussions 
of gamblers' spending habits: "They don't make houses with it; they just finish it all 
up right then and there." Some people feel that if gamblers buy household goods with 
their winnings, they can counter the money's tendency to burn. Others (the majority) 
feel that the loser's anger will intensify in the face of obvious and visible reminders 
of his loss and another's gain. By spending or losing such winnings quickly, without 
visible improvement, the winner defends himself by dispersing possible envy and 
jealousy. Thus people's expectation that the money will burn influences how they 
spend it. Profligate spending, then, reinforces the association between method of gain 
and style of spending. 
EMERGENT CHANGES 
The aspects of cultural logic set forth above form the context in which to 
interpret the phrase, "That money burns like oil!" Many migrants and their families 
make remarks to this effect, and, more importantly, act according to the common 
sense encoded therein (Gramsci 1988). The notion of burning remittances both 
reproduces and transforms the general patterns discussed earlier. Although cultural 
norms predispose actors to think and act in certain ways, the accumulation of 
irregular or deviant actions can stretch and change the cultural categories that 
designate the norm. In Naeaegama, alterations in the cultural logic of money manifest 
themselves in linguistic patterns, financial decisions, and changing obligations to 
extended kin. 
Contradictions 
The idea that remittances burn contradicts older views of money in a number of 
ways. First, most migrants agree that they work hard abroad. Domestic servants toil 
long hours with few or no days off. According to the moral logic revealed in the 
cases discussed earlier, hard, honest work guarantees that wages will thrive for the 
worker. In this case, however, another factor intervenes. Housemaids argue that their 
employers dislike them. Nilani said, "The people in Kuwait don't have kind hearts," 
and offered the following story: 
There was a Sri Lankan New Year holiday festival in Kuwait, and one housemaid was chosen 
Avuruddhu Kumari (New Year Princess). The judge asked her how she liked the place where she 
worked. She said that it was a very good place, and that the Madam was better even than her own 
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mother. All the housemaids laughed and hooted because they didn't believe her. No matter how hard 
you work, those people don't think you've done enough. The Arabs resent paying your wages, so you 
have to use that money fast because it won't keep. That money burns like oil! 
Repeating stories of this nature reinforces a common Sri Lankan stereotype of Arab 
employers as angry, grouchy, and mean. Stories and stereotypes "can be read as 
archives on the human condition that give figurative expression to unresolved 
antagonisms" (Gregory 1996:197). 
In the burning-remittances syndrome, emotions create an after-effect, giving 
agentive powers to the money, which strives to disappear without thriving. But the 
idea that a grouchy employer can make a hardworking housemaid's money burn 
provides a second contradiction. Relational dynamics addressed earlier suggest that 
in a moral conflict between richer and poorer people, a moral universe will conspire 
to favor the poor. This suggests that the moral workings of money exchange should 
protect a poor, hard-working woman from her employer's unreasonable grudge, 
much like the Robin Hood principle in part protects a poor person who steals from 
a rich one. A person who lives reasonably with a clear conscience should find that 
money thrives for her. But despite this, women say that their wages burn. These 
contradictions suggest that remittances from the Middle East burn in a different moral 
context from other money. The changes reflect recent trends in female labor 
migration, and prefigure new family financial strategies. 
Different Views on Burning Remittances 
Naeaegama villagers voiced different points of view on remittances. Nonmigrants 
see burning as an excuse for migrant families' bad planning. Numerous informants 
argued that some migrants did very well with foreign money; they built houses, 
bought cinnamon gardens, and set up stores. These informants suggested that if some 
people can do well with Middle Eastern money, then the money in general is not 
harmful and the fault lies with the Sri Lankan spenders, not their Arab sponsors. 
"Some people use the money well, some waste it." The retired policeman said, "You 
need to be able to manage your money. You need to know how to spend it." Like 
richer villagers who denied the bad effects of immoral money transfers in the older 
cultural logic, these individuals ee the lack of prosperity as an outcome of unsound 
financial decisions, not Arab hostility. 
The retired policeman and his wife (neither of whom has been to the Middle 
East) suggested three reasons that remittances did not really burn (due to money's 
agentive activities), but only seemed to burn (due to migrants' poor financial 
planning). Their list reflects local realities and widely prevalent caricatures and 
stereotypes of migrants held by nonmigrants. First, the policeman's wife suggested 
that some housemaids borrow money at 20 per cent interest from the moneylender 
and that it takes them eight months to a year just to pay back their loan. "No wonder 
their wages disappear!" This assessment of migrants' financial situations closely 
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mirrors the actual situation, but the migrants themselves do not discuss burning in 
terms of repaying debts. 
Second, the couple suggested that some migrants and their families want to have 
"a TV and lots of parties" when the woman returns to Sri Lanka. When the family 
had spent all their money, the woman would go back to the Middle East to earn 
more. This critique typifies the assumptions of a hedonistic wastefulness that many 
nonmigrants hold of migrants and their families. Migrants themselves talk about more 
pressing and immediate needs than for television sets and parties, but do acknowledge 
that their money does get spent quickly without much of lasting material worth to 
show for it. For example, a mother of ten said that the money her daughter sent 
home vanished because she had so many people to feed, and relatives would ask to 
borrow cash. If someone in her extended family lacked food or medicine, then she 
provided it out of her daughter's money. This money burned even though her 
daughter had a good employer. Similarly, a recently returned migrant who had 
worked six years for a good house said, "My money burns in five minutes! Smart 
people can use this money, but I just give it away and finish it off. My son says I 
have no brain, and he criticizes me for giving presents to everyone. He doesn't spend 
money foolishly. He still has the 200 rupees I gave him when I came home." When 
these women say that their remittances burn, they mean that it disappears without 
much trace among needy friends and relatives. 
A third reason why money seems to burn, the retired policeman and his wife 
suggested, is that women often send money to husbands who eat, drink, and sit 
around idly. This popular stereotype has developed a degree of agency, and migrants' 
husbands often feel the need to counter what they assume others will have assumed 
about them, even while accepting the stereotype as true for other husbands. One man 
noted, "Some people get money from their wives and then drink, gamble, and party 
until it's gone. But I didn't waste even five cents' worth of my wife's money." Some 
men do indeed waste money, but nowhere near as many or as much as the caricature 
suggests (Gamburd 2002). Through economic choices, women and their families 
work against the images of the wasteful husband and the pleasure-seeking family. 
Countering Burning 
Over the past two decades, Naeaegama migrants have developed financial 
strategies to limit the burning of their remittances, which they identify as distribution 
of money through many small gifts to friends and extended family. The notion of 
burning remittances represents a reconfiguration of older ideas. As the concepts 
stretch to accommodate emerging realities, contradictions arise. When women leave 
Naeaegama to work abroad, they violate older gendered ideals by depriving their 
families of their domestic labor. Migrants almost always cite as their incentive the 
financial necessity of supporting their families' daily consumption, with the added 
hope of saving money to buy land and build a house. Remittance checks, new shoes, 
fancy pencil cases, cassette players, refrigerators, and above all the foundations for 
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a large cement house stand in for the absent wife and mother. The grand-scale 
consumption of buying or building a house permanently communicates an absent 
woman's devotion to her nuclear family. 
The new discourse on burning remittances allows new spending habits; in 
particular, a woman spends money all at once on a big purchase for her nuclear 
family, instead of spending it in dribs and drabs for the rest of the extended family 
as older social norms require (Gamburd 1998). The retired school principal (whose 
three daughters had worked abroad) insisted on the fairness of such spending, saying, 
"Economic savings isn't stinginess or greed. You must save. You must have 
control." By shifting agency from individual people to the money itself, the discourse 
helps justify this new pattern. In this view, by buying land and building a house, 
women and their immediate families have acted to counter their money's tendency 
to burn, and they have not slighted their relatives or ignored their family obligations. 
Racist stereotypes of angry Arab employers provide the discursive resource to 
legitimize new forms of consumption and new kinship dynamics. 
Rani summarized the new discourse's dictates on when to spend, stating, "You 
have to use that money straight away. If you don't use it fast, it will burn." Migrant 
women often save their money in foreign currencies, either in Sri Lanka or abroad, 
bringing it home in one lump sum and spending it soon after their arrival. Given 
inflation and devaluation of the Sri Lankan rupee, money saved in cash or in a bank 
may lose real value though remaining equal or growing slightly in nominal value. 
Given the many pressing needs for money in the local economy, money remitted to 
relatives is often spent before the woman's return. Thus the new ideas about 
remittances dictate economically sound financial decisions. 
The new discourse, Rani noted, also suggests how to spend money. "Money in 
the bank will vanish; if you start a business, it will go bankrupt. Invest in land and 
a house." Phenomena discussed within the discourse as propensities of the money 
reflect the reality that many small businesses do go under, especially when run in 
difficult economic circumstances by inexperienced and untrained people. Most 
villagers choose to invest in land, a house, and providing dowries for their daughters, 
turning to business ventures only when they have achieved a certain level of domestic 
stability (Gamburd 2003). Although the idea of using money as capital to earn more 
money makes sense in abstract economic terms, a decade of government-initiated 
self-employment schemes has left Naeaegama villagers wary of the risks of 
entrepreneurial activities. Folk theories of money present the distilled essence of local 
encounters with the national and international capitalist economy. 
Gender ideologies constrain spending habits. In many areas of Sri Lanka, women 
bear the responsibility for managing the household finances; people assume that men 
will fritter away any resources their wives fail to commandeer (Stirrat 1989:99). 
These stereotypes hape behaviors. Many men do in fact quickly spend money from 
bribes, autopsies, and gambling on frivolous and pleasurable xpenditures. Although 
female migration presents a radically new labor situation, their wages' alleged agency 
and will to disappear, coupled with older norms of female financial responsibility, 
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constrain what women desire and how they spend their earnings. The new discourse 
empowers women to spend burning remittances in a useful manner, one that runs 
counter both to pursuit of individual gratification and to older obligations for sharing 
with and helping distant relatives. In the past, generalized reciprocity along kin 
networks provided very poor people with an insurance system in the domestic 
economy but inhibited the accumulation of wealth by individuals or nuclear families 
(Weismantel 1995). Naeaegama women's emerging spending habits reflect a change 
in class position, with nuclear families transforming their obligations to kin as they 
move up in the social structure (Gamburd 1999; Stack 1970). A newly prioritized 
object of desire (a plot of land and a house) supersedes both the Western ideal of 
luxury consumption and the older ideal of a strong family support network. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The discourse on burning remittances raises two issues for the study of agency: 
first, the question of how new economic opportunities affect norms surrounding 
gender roles, kinship duties, and moral responsibilities; and second, the question of 
how the purported agency of things supposedly lacking volition (such as money and 
emotions) limits or enables individual actors. Increasing integration into the 
international labor market is transforming the material and social contexts in which 
migrant women and their families act, choose, and live. 
Two different but linked cultural logics of value and morality currently coexist 
in Naeaegama. Money from bribes, gambling, moneylending, stealing, and selling 
illicit liquor burns in a moral universe that governs face-to-face exchanges in a local 
network. This morality assigns a disciplinary agency to transfers of money that 
directs the "haves" to share with the "have-nots" (or at least to treat them fairly). 
Certain institutions, such as banks and lotteries, escape this moral discipline because 
the people involved do not act in agentive or intentioned ways. Of course, not 
everyone shares these views or takes these ideas literally. Some people, especially the 
rich, deny the agentive character of monetary exchanges. They view money in a 
more Western way, thinking that it should be profitable if spent and invested wisely. 
Money earned in the Middle East burns in a different moral universe. One might 
assume that money earned abroad, like that saved, borrowed, stolen, or won from 
faceless institutions like banks, government projects, NGOs, and lotteries, would 
have a morally neutral or "frictionless" quality in transaction. But the emerging 
discourse on remittances provides financial transactions of transnational migration 
with a face: the stereotype of the bad-hearted employer. 
The contradictions inherent in the emerging discourse on burning remittances 
index growing tensions between nuclear and extended families. The newer cultural 
logic pushes women to spend their wages in a fashion that most favors their 
immediate kin. Marx and Simmel both suggest that the capitalist economy enhances 
indifferent, depersonalized relationships and promotes "the growth of individualism 
and the destruction of solidary communities" (Parry and Bloch 1989:4). In the 
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Naeaegama case, citing the dangerous agency that their employers' anger imparts to 
their money, women make decisions that cut off more distant relatives from the fruits 
of their labor. Although these actions do undermine the older, kin-based insurance 
networks, they are less a destruction of community than efforts to qualitatively 
transform a nuclear family's class status. Through the grand-scale consumption of 
buying land and building a house, migrants and their families also offset the negative 
stereotypes of wasteful husbands, negligent wives, and hedonistic families. 
Naeaegama villagers resourcefully use the negative caricatures that pervade the 
discourse to justify their financial decisions. 
A poststructuralist analysis raises the question of who produces, distributes, and 
consumes this discourse, for what reasons, and with what effect (Williams 1977). 
Naeaegama villagers move easily between an animist fetishism (feared but not fully 
believed) and a metaphoric expression of widely accepted moral criticism (less 
frightening but harder to dismiss). At times these issues simmer below the level of 
critical thought; at other times they boil over into open contention in the village. 
Structured discourses about money both constrain and enable individual agency. The 
older discourse assigns a disciplinary agency to money that operates to humble the 
powerful and protect the poor. On one hand, by giving anger agentive force, the 
discourse acknowledges exploitation and deplores unequal social status, functioning 
as a statement of power by the disempowered. On the other hand, this set of ideas 
deflects concrete and material actions of the poor for their own advancement by 
focusing attention on the indirect efficacy of emotional energies instead. The burning- 
money discourse works through both consent and coercion, making it difficult to 
distinguish resistance from acquiescence in any simple or unambiguous way (Ahearn 
2001). Here is a dual power dynamic: the poor perpetuate the discourse to humble 
the rich, and the rich perpetuate it to defang the poor, with each side understanding 
at least a little of the other's motives, and with both sides believing at least a little 
in the other's explanatory logic. 
In sum, the emerging discourse on burning remittances presents a polyvalent text 
on power and inequality. It acknowledges in symbolic form the practical exigencies 
of exploitation and disempowerment inherent in the international division of labor and 
the local economy. It can also be read as justification for recent changes in gendered 
obligations to extended families. The hard-hearted employers in the Middle East take 
the blame for infusing money with a character or agency that requires a woman to 
spend her wages in a lump sum on her nuclear family rather than redistributing it to 
the needy in her wider family sphere. In this cultural logic, an agent's position in the 
social structure still matters, but it no longer protects the hard-working laborer from 
the unjust burning of her money. Although in the older discourse the emotions of the 
underdog could harm a wealthy moneylender, the new system does not punish the 
haughty rich: a housemaid's anger does not affect her Arab employers,6 and poor 
relatives' wishes do not outweigh the needs of the nuclear family. Nonetheless, 
integration into the global capitalist system has not (yet) reduced social relations to 
mere exchange relations measured in cash terms (Nash 2000:129). Migrant women 
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and their families struggle to reassess morality and agency in a globalizing economic 
world. 
NOTES 
1. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant number SBR-9903314. 
My thanks go to Laura Ahearn, Denise Hare, Webb Keane, Charlene Makley, and Anupama Rao for 
their insights and suggestions. 
2. Throughout this essay the terms "Middle East," "West Asia," and "the Persian Gulf" 
interchangeably designate the oil-producing nations of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
3. The names of places and people have been changed to protect the informants' privacy. 
4. Compare Taussig (1980:110) on Columbian plantation owners who fear the sorcery of their 
workers: "The people who believe in sorcery recognize that the sorcerer's power depends upon the 
existence of a shared culture, through which medium sorcery achieves its end." 
5. Compare Shipton (1997:173) on Luo beliefs that if people use "bitter money" for bridewealth 
payments, the bride will sicken and die. 
6. Although housemaids do not sense their own power in this regard, employers fear the ill will of 
their domestic servants, particularly their abilities to spread malicious gossip, mistreat children, and 
adulterate food. 
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